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The Philippines’ anti-terror bill is poised to cause more terror

The government needs to accept that there are no shortcuts to peace and retract the bill.

As the world is plagued by COVID-19, an impending anti-terrorism bill is creating more fear in the Philippines.

Recently passed by Congress , the bill is set to be signed into law by President Rodrigo Duterte. If this happens, the bill will not only suppress the fundamental rights and freedoms of Filipinos, it will also terrorise the same conflict-affected communities it seeks to protect, as it undoes decades of peacebuilding work.

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Despite protests against the bill and mounting calls to provide more time for deliberations, Congress has quietly fast-tracked its passage while the rest of the country braced for the impact of COVID-19. The bill will allow for a lengthened period of warrantless detention and expanded surveillance of those law enforcement deems suspicious. It will also remove stiff penalties for wrongful detention.  

Most importantly, the bill carries a vague definition of “terrorism” that offers little distinction between organisations that commit acts of terror and revolutionary armed movements, which is important for those doing mediation among warring parties. The bill will provide law enforcers with broad powers to determine what constitutes a “terrorist”, shifting the burden of proof to suspected individuals and organisations. This is not only a threat to dissent and democracy, but also to peace.

Threat to peace in Mindanao

For more than half a century, the Philippine government has been trying to quell secessionist and communist armed movements in the country.

Bangsamoro, an autonomous region in the south of the Philippines, is currently in transition after decades of fighting between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. While much remains to be done, significant strides have been taken , with a transitional regional government installed last year and the decommissioning of combatants and arms under way. These gains have been made possible primarily by the peace talks and reconciliation processes.

The ill-advised and shortsighted fear of the ISIL (ISIS) armed group taking root in Mindanao, and the increased framing of the communist armed movements as “terrorist”, distract the government from seeing the gains of dialogue and peacebuilding.

The threat of terrorism is real, but it is not the main threat to peace.

In fact, militaristic approaches to counterterrorism have caused the most suffering and displacements, prompted  breakdowns in ongoing peace processes , and given birth to more aggressive splinter groups like the Abu Sayyaf, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and Maute Group.

Insensitivity to the local context and the peace process in prioritising fighting terrorists in Mamasapano in 2015 and Marawi in 2017 delayed the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law and undermined reconciliation across communities in the country. These should not be forgotten, and should not be repeated.

Opening old wounds

Due to a long history of discrimination, the Moro and Muslim minorities in the Philippines are often most affected not only by terrorist attacks but by harassment and warrantless arrests packaged as “counterterrorism”.

This profiling of Muslims as violent “terrorists” continues to this day. In January, it was discovered that the Manila Police District was collating information about Muslim youth and students in the National Capital Region for its “ preventing violent extremism” initiatives .

Two months before, in November 2019, the police barged into the office of a long-established Mindanao-based peacebuilding organisation , without a warrant, checked the living quarters, and inspected the bags of young Moros from Marawi who were attending a psychosocial support training.

Being a woman while being both Moro and Muslim adds another layer of vulnerability, especially with the heightened visibility that comes with wearing a headscarf. Women widowed by war and children orphaned by conflict are also disproportionately affected by counterterrorism that narrowly sees them as vulnerable to being recruited into terrorism, instead of partners who can inform policies for change.

This bill will undermine efforts at reconciliation, as it will make it easier to target Muslims and open old wounds anew.

Ending or escalating the communist insurgency?

The military generals clearly see the impending anti-terrorism bill as a way to “end” the world’s oldest existing communist insurgency. But the bill is more likely to reignite war and bring further insecurity.

Following the termination of the peace negotiations between the government, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA) and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines in 2017, the government has since branded the CPP-NPA as “terrorist” and filed a petition seeking to declare them terrorist organisations under the Human Security Act, the current counterterrorism law. Following delayed progress through the courts, the government has taken a new tack: change the law directly. Thus, the Anti Terror Bill.

The argument about whether the CPP-NPA is a terrorist organisation or a revolutionary movement is fraught with a lot of biases, and a long, violent history between the communist armed movement and the military. What is clear is that the impending declaration of the CPP-NPA as terrorist organisations will impede any future peace talks, and escalate violence and displacement in communities.

As lessons have not been learned, the military should be reminded that the CPP-NPA was at its strongest under the martial law regime of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos. It is not activism that pushes communities towards violence. Rather, it is crackdowns on nonviolent civic action that will push communities to lose trust in government and take alternative routes for affecting change.

‘Activism is not terrorism’

The government assures the public that crackdowns on activists will not happen under the guise of counterterrorism, but in the same breath the Speaker of the House tells activists to “not allow terrorists to hide within [their] ranks.” This statement itself is telling of the government’s narrow and misinformed mindset about activism and terror – that those who are radicalised through activism will participate in armed rebellions and, therefore, to prevent “violent extremism” the state should stop “radicalisation” made possible through activism.  

Given this bias, and the weak intelligence capacity of law enforcers, the bill will crush progressive organisations and student activists who the state perceives are communist fronts; mediators who are perceived as communist sympathisers; and Indigenous people who are perceived as the main targets of recruitment by the NPA.  

These groups are already being “red-tagged” or wrongly targeted for alleged links with the CPP-NPA .  Even without the new law and under the martial law in place until last year, young Indigenous people who work on peacebuilding in Western Mindanao were reportedly wrongly included in the military’s “terrorist lists,” and asked to show themselves to law enforcers and prove they are not linked with the NPA. As the Senate president admitted, there is no need for martial law once this bill becomes law.

The looming anti-terror law will assume rather than fairly test the guilt of civilians, as law enforcers will have free reign to arrest and detain individuals based on mere suspicion. This is both unconstitutional and dangerous.

No shortcuts to peace

If implemented, the new anti-terrorism bill will not only impede our ability as peacebuilders and human rights defenders to bridge divides or raise the alarm when atrocities occur. It will also put our lives and limbs at risk. It will undo years of peacebuilding and further devastate the communities worst affected by terror. 

If it is sincere in its “ whole-of-nation approach” to peacebuilding , the government must retract the bill, re-open deliberations and listen to a wide range of voices across society, especially the voices of those who have borne the brunt of both terrorist violence and abusive counterterror laws.  It  must heed the lessons from community leaders and peacebuilders. We need a policy that addresses the underlying roots of terrorism, and that prevents further distrust, injustice and escalations in violence.  

Yet as I write this, trust in the government is also under threat. What is left of our democracy is under threat. Peace is under threat.

It is our collective duty to end violence against civilian communities. For this same reason, we cannot take shortcuts to peace.

This rushed and unrestrained anti-terror bill will cause terror – and it will come from the state.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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[OPINION] The dark shadow of the Anti Terror Act

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This is AI generated summarization, which may have errors. For context, always refer to the full article.

Activists from different progressive groups gathered in front of the Commission on Human Office in Quezon City on Tuesday, December 7, upon learning that the Supreme Court have voted for the Anti-Terror Law. Joining them are former Congressman Neri Colmenares, who is also running for a senate seat and Bong Labog, likewise a senatorial candidate. Photos by Angie de Silva/Rappler

Angie de Silva/Rappler

In the first article of this series , the landmark decision of the Manila RTC denying the proscription of the CPP-NPA as a terrorism organization under the Human Security Act of 2007 (HSA) was discussed and dissected to discover how the presiding judge came to their conclusion. In this article, the ramifications and significance of the decision will be appreciated, specifically comparing the HSA with the Anti-Terror Act of 2020 (ATA). The article will address the dangers of red-tagging or policing activism in the name of the war on terror and other concerns of the democracy regarding legislation that seeks to proscribe terrorism. 

It is important to parse out the distinction made by the Court between terrorism and political crimes. The Philippine jurisdiction and its penal laws have consistently made a distinction between “political crimes” and common crimes. The former are aimed at achieving a political purpose against a political order. Under the doctrine of People v. Hernandez , common crimes which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense, say rebellion, “are divested of their character as ‘common’ offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty ( People v. Hernandez, cited in Satur Ocampo v. Hon. Elhrem Abando, et.al. ).” An act like killing is not a common crime like homicide or murder if it is committed in furtherance of rebellion. The killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion and becomes a mere ingredient of the rebellion. The accused can only be prosecuted for the political crime, the rebellion.

Red-tagging, a natural consequence and pressing danger

Red-tagging removes an important distinction by lumping together through broad and indiscriminate strokes all those who associate with activist organizations with those who espouse violence aimed at overthrowing the government, as a means to achieve the same. 

Even judges have not been spared from this red-tagging, as we have seen in the statements of Lorrraine Badoy against Judge Magdoza-Malagar.

The nature of the CPP-NPA organization is political with political goals. The organization is by nature steeped in ideology. But does holding these ideologies automatically mean one is willing to commit terrorism acts?  Is this an encroachment on to the exercise of the free mind and the right to associate with above-ground organizations which espouse these political leanings in a lawful way?

In 1964, the Supreme Court of the Philippines saw the social dangers of red-tagging and enunciated in the landmark case of People v. Amado V. Hernandez that a belief in or active espousal of communist ideologies is not the same in actual participation in a conspiracy to overthrow the government by force. The Court there held “the act of indoctrinating and preparing its members for the revolution is not the revolution itself.”

There is a vast sea separating membership in legal organizations that share the ideals of violent communist groups and the groups which commit acts of violence themselves. This sea continues to exist even if it is proven that there may be some bridges that a portion of individual members choose to cross. Ideas are not intended to cause death or serious harm to any person, endanger a life, or create a threat to public safety. Without a physical act to accomplish this, how could an idea be capable and held accountable?

Lastly for this point, the Court appreciated the dangers of naming above-ground organizations as “fronts” for the criminal acts of the CPP-NPA. These organizations include political, activist, and civil society groups that have been essentially accused of willful association with what the State would describe as a terrorist organization. These accusations, though not penalized under the HSA, take on a more serious character under the ATA.

Now, the Anti-Terror Act

On October 1, the Philippine government, speaking through Press Secretary Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Justice Secretary Jesus Crispin Remulla, declared their intention to file another proscription case against the CPP-NPA under the ATA.

It is important to remember that the petition was resolved under the Human Security Act, which was expressly repealed by the Anti-Terror Act in 2020. There are several important distinctions between the two laws, which shall be discussed below.

Come now to the ATA, which does penalize recruitment to, or membership in, a judicially proscribed terrorist organization, association, or group. Section 10 of the ATA provides a fundamental departure from the HSA by penalizing mere association through membership and recruitment. Going back to the discussion of red-tagging and the established relationship between different organizations in the CPP-NPA recruitment process, what guarantee does an individual have to not be lumped in with the associations of their legitimate association?

In contrast to the HSA, the ATA has sharp teeth that can draw blood quickly. Under the HSA, a group, association, or organization was labeled a terrorist one purely through judicial proscription. 

However, as seen by President Duterte’s 2017 designation of the CPP-NPA, the ATA expands these limits and to grant authority to the Executive, through the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), to automatically adopt the designation of terrorist groups made by the United Nations Security Council. 

[ANALYSIS] Is the CPP-NPA a terrorist organization?

The power of designation grated the ATC was originally broader, but the Supreme Court of the Philippines in December of last year limited its powers by striking down as unconstitutional the ATC’s ability to designate terrorist groups upon the request of other countries or upon determination that it meets the relevant criteria of the United Nations Security Council. Still, these expansions outside of judicial proscription pose a danger, specifically when coupled with the other “innovations” of the ATA which will soon be discussed.

Firstly, the HSA included the crime of rebellion, punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, in the enumeration of acts which may constitute the crime of terrorism, if met with the qualifications discussed in the previous article in this series. To quickly reiterate, that is that it causes widespread and extraordinary fear in the general population of the archipelago for the purpose of coercing the government into accepting an unlawful demand. The difference here may actually weaken the case of the government, if it should choose to file another one. The definition of terrorism under Section 4 of the ATA, which expressly repealed Section 3 of the HSA, is more in line with the academic definition of terrorism – the creation of an atmosphere of fear without the intent of wresting power from the constituted authority of the government.

To reiterate, even if the courts do not proscribe the CPP-NPA, or any other accused group, as a terrorist organization, the Anti-Terrorism Council established under the ATA is empowered by Section 25 of the Act to designate the same as such. 

Secondly, terrorism under the ATA no longer defined on the basis of predicate crimes as defined under the Revised Penal Code and other special laws. The updated definition of “terrorism” in the Philippine jurisdiction is through “acts,” regardless of their stage of execution, which are committed by any person within or outside of the Philippines.

Lastly, the ATA allows for the label of terrorism to attach to individuals for committing the acts enumerated under Section 4 of the ATA, if conditions are satisfied. Membership is both integral and dispensable for the ATA. Even without performing any of the acts enumerated in the ATA, mere membership in and recruitment to a proscribed organization already merits a penalty.

The danger of membership without any act committed by the individual being equated to terrorism cannot be understated. As previously discussed, the structure of the recruitment system of the CPP-NPA involves levels of organizations with varying legality. The distinctions between activists and possible terrorists can be blurred with little to no consequences for the government as the safeguards to prevent wanton accusations have been removed. Those tagged as suspect can be held for longer, on lesser suspicions, and in the end if vindicated, will receive no reparations for their suffering. 

If another case was filed against the CPP-NPA under the ATA, would the next petition succeed by learning from the decision of the Manila RTC? How many cases can be expected to be filed under the ATA that lack the years of preparation and mountainous evidence presented in the ultimately unsuccessful petition, simply because there are fewer consequences for the accuser? 

Clearly, we are standing on the precipice of a more slippery slope. There is a distinction between political rebels, activists, and terrorists that should not be erased from our penal statutes, lest we risk losing fundamental freedoms like the right to redress our grievances against the government, to organize, associate, and speak truth to power.  – Rappler.com

Tony La Viña teaches law and is former dean of the Ateneo School of Government.

Ally Munda is a law student at the University of the Philippines Diliman. She has a degree in Environmental Science from the Ateneo de Manila University and has joined the Manila Observatory as a legal researcher. 

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Anti-Terror Act remains dangerous and fundamentally flawed

Media quote.

Responding to the judgement by the Supreme Court of the Philippines declaring two portions of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 as unconstitutional, Butch Olano, Amnesty International Philippines Section Director said:

“The decision by the Supreme Court highlights key dangers of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 – its overbroad definition of terrorism and the overreaching powers it grants the Anti-Terrorism Council. However, only two portions of the law were declared unconstitutional, and it remains deeply flawed and open to abuse by government authorities.

“Even with the Supreme Court’s decision, the law still allows the police and military to detain suspects without a warrant or charge for up to 24 days, which violates international law and standards. It grants overbroad powers to security forces to conduct surveillance, and to the Anti-Terrorism Council to designate groups and individuals as ‘terrorists’ without due process and without clear procedures to remove such designation. Other dangerous provisions also remain.

We reiterate our call for the government to amend the  Anti-Terrorism Act to ensure it is consistent with international human rights law and standards. Until this happens, the law will continue to pose a threat to human rights defenders, activists as well as members of marginalised groups and others wrongly accused of terrorism by granting the government excessive and unchecked powers and being susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

“We reiterate our call for the government to amend the  Anti-Terrorism Act to ensure it is consistent with international human rights law and standards. Until this happens, the law will continue to pose a threat to human rights defenders, activists as well as members of marginalised groups and others wrongly accused of terrorism by granting the government excessive and unchecked powers and being susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”

On 9 December, the Supreme Court of the Philippines announced that Justices voted to strike down two portions of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020.

The qualifier under Section 4(e) – that terrorism as defined by the law does not include advocacy, protest, dissent and similar actions “which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety” – is declared unconstitutional “for being overbroad and violative of freedom of expression”, according to the Supreme Court. With this decision, this part now reads: “Provided, that terrorism as defined in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights.”

The Supreme Court also declared unconstitutional the power of the Anti-Terrorism Council to designate a person or a group as terrorists based on a request by another country and upon determination that it meets the criteria of relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

On 3 July 2020, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte signed into law the “Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020”, which replaced the Human Security Act of 2007. Amnesty International had called on the Philippine government to  reject  the law on the basis that it contained dangerous provisions and risked further undermining human rights in the country.

ANTI – TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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Why The Philippines Needs An Anti-Terror Bill

Hundreds of protesters wearing face masks and shields carry anti-terror bill placards as they march at a university campus in Manila on 4 June, 2020, a day after congress passed an anti-terror bill. (AFP Photo)

It has been three years now since the tragic “Marawi Siege”, but until now, terrorist attacks continue to permeate the Philippines making it hard for the government to secure its citizens from those who persistently seek to attack the lives and the way of life of every Filipino. The Marawi Siege  just like the tragic events of 11 September (9/11), the Bali bombings, and the home-grown terrorists’ attacks in London, is the quintessence of the country’s long struggle against terrorism. Even while facing a deadly pandemic, the internal and external threats of terrorism are continuously making a dent in the country’s peace and security; compounding the already difficult situation brought about by the novel coronavirus.

Hence, it cannot be denied that the Philippines, more predominantly the southern part of the country where the Maute Group also known as the Islamic State of Lanao, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) then linked with international terror organisation, Al-Qaeda and now with the Islamic State are situated, has long been a haven of terrorist activities. There’re also the intimidations posed by pro-IS Bangsamoro Freedom Fighters (BIFF), whose leader Sheik Muhiddin Animbang, alias Commander “Kagi Karialan” recently made a plea to his followers to unleash attacks against the government of the Philippines. BIFF forces are mainly situated in the forested and mountainous areas of Maguindanao and Cotabato and are unhappy with the government’s policy of not allowing congregation in mosques because of the COVID-19 pandemic. This according to them is “destroying Islam.” 

The country has also faced growing aggression from the New People’s Army (NPA) of the Communist Party of the Philippines, National Democratic Front (CPP-NDF). The CPP-NPA-NDF is listed as a terrorist organisation by the United States (US), European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The Philippines is also vulnerable to possible external attacks from extremist networks like ISIS and elements of the Southeast Asian terror group, Jemaah Islamiyah.

On 17 April, 2020, 11 soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were killed, while 14 others were wounded during an encounter with suspected ASG members in Brgy Danag, Patikul, Sulu. Likewise, on 27 May, 2020 six thousand residents of Maguindanao had to abandon their homes because of terrorist attacks. And on 5 June, the AFP lost four more soldiers while 17 others were injured in another military encounter with members of the ASG in Sitio Lagaron in Barangay Kan-Ague, Patikul, Sulu.

On 21 March, 2020 in Iligan city, the 44th Infantry Battalion (44th IB) of the AFP was able to thwart an attempted attack by the NPAs to disrupt a government information campaign on COVID-19 in Barangay Penaranda, Kabasalan, Zamboanga Sibugay. Then on 28 March, the NPA launched another attack on government forces in Rizal. Around 30 NPA rebels assaulted a group of 18 Philippine Army Community Support Program Team (PACSPT) soldiers who were in Barangay Puray, Rizal distributing leaflets and relief goods to distraught residents affected by the enhanced community quarantine. 

The said clash took the life of one soldier and also one fatality on the part of the NPA. Similarly, on 7 April, 2020, the NPA launched an assault in Pantukan, Davao de Oro, where they attacked the Philippine National Police Mobile Force Company in Barangay Tangdanua. On the same day (7 April), around 30 NPA rebels attacked village officials distributing relief assistance at Sitio Nagon in Barangay Guinmayohan, Balangiga Eastern Samar and forcibly seized some portion of the relief supplies/aid intended for residents of the area affected by the quarantine measures due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

In Calbiga Samar, along a route between Barangays Hubasan and Binanggaran, communist rebels planted landmines as a plot to ambush government forces, which also posed a threat to the lives of the residents of the said areas. Two suspected NPA operatives were intercepted at Barangay Llavac in Real, Quezon, where two anti-personnel mines and four blasting caps were confiscated by the 1st Infantry Battalion. On 22 April, the NPA launched another attack using a bomb on a remote village in Paquibato District, Davao City to disrupt the distribution of a cash emergency subsidy under the Social Amelioration Program (SAP) in the area. Two soldiers were slightly wounded during the fight. 

In retrospect, the Philippines is indeed facing serious security challenges on multiple fronts. Muslim extremist groups and the NPA are certainly taking advantage of the COVID-19 outbreak, and are continuously pursuing acts of violence and aggression against government forces and innocent civilians. Now more than ever, it becomes imperative for the government to effectively respond not only to the challenges posed by the COVID-19 virus but also to the threats of terrorism in the country. 

The Anti-Terrorism Bill    

The Anti-Terrorism Bill, which has been officially transmitted to the Office of the President for signing as confirmed by Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque on 9 June, 2020, is the improved version of the Human Security Act of 2007. The said bill, just like the Human Security Act of 2007, is very controversial and is confronted by debates between the realists/pragmatists who are cognisant of the need for tougher and compelling counter-terrorism legislation grounded on actual realities, and those who are out of touch and have failed to recognise the enormity and seriousness of numerous terrorist threats confronting the country. 

The Anti-Terrorism Bill just like the Human Security Act of 2007 is being opposed by the political opposition and human rights groups who are claiming that the bill contains dangerous provisions that could be abused by authorities once implemented. Others are saying that it has unconstitutional provisions that would undermine the Bill of Rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. 

However, the principal author of the bill, Senator Panfilo Lacson argued that the “Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020” aims to secure the country and its people from domestic and foreign terrorist attacks. He said that with the help of his colleagues in the Senate, he has made sure that the bill adheres to the Bill of Rights enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. He even articulated that he incorporated most of the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism laws of other strong democracies like Australia and the US, which by far are guided by the standards set by the United Nations (UN).

Despite the explanations and justifications offered by Senator Lacson, those who oppose the bill continue to advocate a popular misconception that the Anti-Terrorism Bill is the anti-thesis of human rights and would likely violate the fundamental rights of Filipinos the moment it is passed into law. This is preposterous. Human rights principles are not rigid and do not constrain the government from effectively countering dangers posed by terrorism. International human rights principles/laws, being the reverberations of the great world wars have long recognised the necessity to strike a balance between national security interests of a particular state and the fundamental rights of its inhabitants. 

Practically speaking, this means that on issues such as terrorism, individual rights have to be balanced against the collective security and collective rights of the greater number of people, especially if it’s about securing the collective survival of the greater number of people against aggression and the destruction of human lives caused by terrorism. This further means that human rights laws/principles allow governments to take protective actions proportionate to the severity of the threats. Hence, terrorism being a gross human rights violation requires tougher and stronger counter-terrorism legislation that is proportionate to the objective of safeguarding and preserving the national security and integrity of a particular state/government. 

By the same token, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 is a stronger and tougher piece of legislation compared to the Human Security Act of 2007, which according to its principal author Senator Lacson, “aims to protect the Philippines and its citizens from terrorist acts that know no timing nor borders, perpetrated in a manner so sudden, least expected and indiscriminate – as in, anytime, probably even today, tomorrow or next week”, endowed with equally strong check and control mechanisms that protect and safeguards the individual rights of people who might be subjected to it in the advent that it becomes a law.” 

Terrorism is a global predicament, and no country is invulnerable to it. The Philippines has experienced terrorism for more or less 44 years which started on 7 April, 1976 when three Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) members hijacked a Philippine Airlines BAC-111 jetliner from Southern Philippines and ordered it flown to Libya. Until this very day, even in the midst of a deadly pandemic, the country is continuously being tormented by the scourge of terrorist attacks coming from but not limited to the Maute Group, ASG, BIFF, and even the NPA. 

The dangers and threats of terrorism in the Philippines are both, legitimate and real. Hence, the government has both the duty and the right to catechise counter-terrorism legislative measures that will protect the national security and integrity of the country and to safeguard its citizens from the brutal and ruthless effects of terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism Bill serves that purpose. 

The Anti-Terrorism Bill – if rendered with fair and objective judgment – will strike a balance between effectiveness in responding to the threat of terrorism and protecting basic human rights principles. The bill has safeguard provisions that protect the basic human rights of Filipinos enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. It has safeguards against abuse, error, and illegality. It also has provisions where charges or actual enforcement of the bill’s provision by its implementers will be subject to quick, effective, and a full review by independent courts in the country. 

Hence, the fears of those who want the bill junked are mislaid. The concern probably should not be on the bill per se, but rather on the strict and proper implementation of the said bill the moment it becomes a law. And this is a completely different matter altogether.

Moreover, the hostility and antagonism accorded to the Anti-Terrorism Bill by fragments of Philippine society should not be construed as representing the entire Filipino nation because that is not true. Many, if not the majority of Filipinos recognise the importance of enacting the Anti-Terrorism Bill into law. 

Likewise, it also doesn’t mean that just because some sections of the community are against the bill, the government of the Philippines will abandon its position or its course of action for fear of offending those who oppose it.    

In the advent of the novel coronavirus pandemic, the threats posed by COVID-19 and terrorism are both serious and real and need the utmost consideration of the government. It’s not either-or, or neither-nor, it’s both, and both need to be addressed swiftly. It will not be to the detriment of Filipinos if the government responds to both threats, rather it will be for their safety. There should be no duality or contradiction. The COVID-19 pandemic and terrorism are lethal threats to the country and both deserve attention.

Related Articles: 

Preventing another ‘Battle of Marawi’

Filipinos Rally Against Anti-Terror Bill

Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy is Professor of Political Science, International Relations, Development Studies, European Studies, SEA and China Studies. She has worked with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other local and international NGOs as a consultant. She is President of Techperformance Corp, an IT-based company in the Philippines.

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Public Views on the Anti-Terrorism Act (formerly Bill C-36)

3.0 detailed findings (cont'd), 3.3 reactions to the anti-terrorism act.

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After participants were asked about terrorism in general and their awareness of the Anti-terrorism Act was gauged, they were introduced to specific provisions of the Act . For each provision, a handout was distributed (see Appendix C) and was read by the participants, and a discussion followed.

3.3.1 Overview of the Anti-terrorism Act

Participants were first given a brief description of the Anti-terrorism Act (see handout 1 in Appendix C).

This description triggered a wide range of reactions, depending on the participants' views on foreign politics and terrorism. Qualitatively, opinions appeared to be divided along the following five lines:

• A small number of participants felt that the Canadian legislation is probably not tough enough. ( "Classic Canadiana: sounds tough, but not enough to stop anything." )
• Some participants were somewhat reassured and comforted that Canada is doing something to fight terrorism. ( "I'm willing to give up something to be safer." ) There appeared to be more participants with this opinion than with the first one, but fewer than those with the third one. Those who felt this way were mostly English-speaking participants from Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, Halifax, Regina, Calgary, and Vancouver. These participants could be further divided into two groups: those who thought the Act might deter terrorism and those who were sceptical because "there is nothing that will stop those people."
• The largest number of participants felt that the description was too vague and did not tell them enough to allow them to form an opinion . Those who felt this way were mostly English-speaking participants from Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, Halifax Group 1, Regina Group 1, Calgary, and Vancouver. These participants asked: "What investigative tools? What do they mean by ensuring that Canadian values are preserved? This sounds great, but how does it work? How far does it go?"
• Some participants were concerned that this law is "a knee-jerk reaction" which may lead to the authorities becoming "paranoid." These people tended to express concerns about privacy and/or racial discrimination. ( "The media made out terrorists as Middle Eastern" ). This opinion was only expressed by a few French-speaking participants, particularly in Montreal and Quebec City.
• Some participants were opposed to the law because they saw it as driven by the United States and considered it a serious threat to the rights of Canadians. Typically, these participants did not think that terrorists should be treated any differently from other criminals and they had serious concerns about the potential for abuse by the police or the authorities in general. ( "I find it aberrant to use the word terrorism to qualify people as though they were different from people who commit crimes." ) However, only a few French-speaking participants from Montreal and Quebec City and a few Group 2 participants in Regina and Halifax were of this opinion, although they were very vocal about it.

Generally, participants across both age groups and in all cities felt that the description was "very vague," "very broad," and they questioned some of the terminology used in the description. "Sounds good, but what does it mean?" Participants needed more information on the Act before they could give their full opinions.

All sounds good, but it is general and all-encompassing. (Calgary, Group 2) Terrorism is a reality in our lives. This sounds very good, but it is vague and non-committal. (Regina, Group 1) What does it allow police to do? (Toronto, Group 1) I need details. (Montreal, English Group 2)

One of the primary questions participants asked was "How does it work?" Some participants suggested that the inclusion of vague terminology contributed to the feeling that the description itself is weak. For example, many would have liked further explanation of the 'new investigative tools' that can be used to fight terrorism. Some concern was expressed that these 'new investigative tools' could be used by authorities to take away individual civil rights. The statement "Canadian values of respect and fairness" was reassuring to some participants; however, it appeared to contradict the idea of 'new investigative tools.'

Ambiguous - "deter" and "identify" are not specific enough. (Regina, Group 2) Talks about stronger laws, but it doesn't say what they are. (Vancouver, Group 1)

Some participants acknowledged that balancing individual rights and freedoms and fighting terrorism is a difficult task, and they were not sure the description of the Act reflects such a balance. They agreed that we live in "scary" times and that individuals may have to sacrifice some of their rights for the greater good, safety, and protection of the country as a whole.

It's scary, but so is terrorism. We live in a scary world. (Calgary, Group 1) I agree very much in principle, but the trick lies in obtaining a proper balance. (Montreal, English Group 2)

The reference to 'hate crimes and propaganda' was also found by some participants in Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City to require a better explanation; the word propaganda, in particular, was interpreted by some as a threat to the freedom of expression. One participant suggested that the reference to stronger laws against propaganda could be used to target legitimate groups.

That could apply to Greenpeace or any labour union. (Quebec City, Group 1)

Some participants, particularly in the older groups in Winnipeg and Halifax, wondered what the new 'safeguards' for fighting terrorism were; they felt that the term required more explanation.

A significant minority of participants in Winnipeg, Regina, and Vancouver felt that the Act would only be as good as the funding and manpower that was devoted to it. In their opinion, the Canadian government does not have either in place to support the implementation of the activities referred to in the description.

Do we have the infrastructure in place to enforce this law or is it just lip service? (Vancouver, Group 2) Are they going to act on it? How much money and resources are being put into it? (Regina, Group 1)

Other participants in Winnipeg and Regina wondered who actually controls and enforces the 'new investigative tools.' Is it the Government, CSIS, or the police? They expressed some concern that if the power was left in the wrong hands, these 'tools' could be abused.

Some participants felt that the existence of the Act represented a step in the right direction. They saw the Act as something positive because it indicated that Canada had something in place in the event of an attack by terrorists. Just knowing that it exists brought a measure of comfort to some participants. The Act was also perceived in a positive light because it responded to United Nations requirements.

A few participants wondered why they had never heard of the Act prior to the session, and others wondered if anyone had been charged under the Act since its inception.

Why don't I know about this? (Halifax, Group 2)

Moreover, Group 2 participants in Vancouver expressed some concern that they never seemed to hear any news from the Government about fighting crime and said that they would like more information in this regard.

Participants in both Toronto groups and in Winnipeg Group 2 questioned why there was no reference to the rights of visible minorities in the brief description of the Act. More specifically, they wondered if the 'new investigative tools' and the Act itself would lead to racial profiling of visible minority groups. This reaction did not appear to come up in other cities.

It doesn't mention ethnicity. What about the rights of visible minorities? (Toronto, Group 1)

The sentence "Bill C-36 is not just a reaction to events…" was not believed by most participants in Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City, who wondered why it was passed in the fall of 2001; they suspected that it was passed under pressure from the United States to secure borders.

I'd say that Canada was influenced by the States. (Ottawa, French Group 1) After 9/11, the perception in the States was that there were terrorists in Canada and that it was easy to go through the border. (Ottawa, English Group 1) Canada has had to do it under pressure from the States. (Montreal, French Group 1)

However, as mentioned previously, many participants in the other cities took comfort in knowing that the Act was created/passed in response to a United Nations request and that Canada adhered to a United Nations obligation.

The general reaction among participants in both age groups and in all cities demonstrates that if this brief description were presented to the public, it would most likely generate more questions than answers.

Comparative Toughness

Most participants indicated that they thought that the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act was less severe than similar anti-terrorism laws in the United States, but they did not know for certain. This was not primarily based on knowledge of the laws or personal experience, but rather on the perception that the United States has extremely harsh and tough anti-terrorism laws. While some participants believed that the anti-terrorism laws of the United States and Canada are similar, enforcement of the laws was thought to be more severe in the United States than in Canada.

A few participants felt that Canada would give offenders under the Act a "slap on the wrist" compared to the perceived harsher 'justice' that would be dealt out in the United States. Canada was perceived by some to have rather lenient laws generally, in relation to other countries.

Ours are less severe. The Government doesn't back what they say they are doing. (Halifax, Group 1)

With regard to the anti-terrorism laws of the United Kingdom, even if several participants could not tell and/or would not hazard a guess, once again, the perception was that the Canadian laws are less severe. One reason given by participants for this perception was that the United Kingdom was instrumental in the 'War on Terrorism' carried out by the United States and other coalition countries in Iraq.

3.3.2 Definition of a Terrorist Activity

A handout introducing the definition of a terrorist activity was distributed to participants (see handout 2 in Appendix C).

Most of the participants were satisfied with the definition of a terrorist activity and claimed that it was necessary, that it seemed "comprehensive," and that it "explained well" what terrorism is.

However, it was not clear to some that all three criteria have to be met (i.e. the act is motivated by political, religious, or ideological purposes; the act is intended to intimidate the public or compel the government not to do something; and the act is intended to harm through violence/death or to interfere with an essential service) in order for something to be considered an act of terrorism. When this was not properly understood, participants were much more likely to be wary of the definition. When they understood it, they typically reacted as follows:

I think it is very fair; it has to be all three criteria. (Halifax, Group 2)

Many participants who were receptive to the definition felt that the fact that it was very broad and all encompassing worked to its advantage. That is, if the definition was narrowed down any further, it might exclude actual terrorist groups. Indeed, a broad definition appeared to be key for these participants.

Pretty broad, as it should be. (Regina, Group 1) This has a wide scope. It needs to have one. (Vancouver, Group 2)

Some participants, however, took issue with the definition. Mainly, they found that the definition was far too broad, that it could apply to "pressure groups" such as environmentalists, anti-globalization activists, and even demonstrating labour union members, although the law specifically excludes work stoppages, protests, advocacy, or dissent.

You could jail environmentalists with this on the grounds that they are ideologically motivated, intend to compel the government to do something, and may interfere with an essential service. (Montreal, Group 2)

French-speaking participants, who remembered the War Measures Act being invoked during the October crisis, when hundreds of individuals were jailed, including well-known politicians, singers, and artists, expressed serious concerns.

Just reading, the union groups could be considered terrorists; they go against the law when they occupy a minister's office. (Quebec City, Group 2) I've been a terrorist several times in my life, according to this definition; it's unclear. (Quebec City, Group 1)

In the particular instance described by the last comment, the participant was concerned about the interpretation that a judge could give to a protest group.

Some participants in Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Halifax, Regina, and Vancouver were trying to find 'loopholes' in the definition, using the examples of Greenpeace, the Hell's Angels, seal hunters, and anti-globalization protestors, and trying to figure out if these groups fit this description. They were still unclear as to whether or not these groups might be described as 'terrorists' under the definition. Some of them concluded that the definition was dependent on the discretion of those who have the power to charge someone with an offence. They hoped that the definition would be applied fairly.

Almost everyone is a terrorist under this definition. Could legitimate groups be targeted? (Vancouver, Group 2) It's still a bit general. Are there loopholes? (Halifax, Group 1)

With regard to the wording of the provision, "intimidate the public or a segment of the public" was believed to be very broad and vague, and "interfere with or seriously disrupt an essential service, facility, or system" was found to be very encompassing and was perceived as giving a lot of latitude to judges, who could label and consider as terrorists almost any activist group or protester.

Perceived Usefulness

Participants were divided on whether the definition of a terrorist activity was a useful tool in identifying who is a terrorist and who is not. Again, it appeared to come down to who was making this decision. More importantly, very few believed that it would be effective in preventing terrorist acts, since "there was no way to stop somebody who is prepared to die," someone who is prepared to be a martyr for a cause.

Many did not believe that this definition per se may have helped prevent terrorist acts or offences or may help prevent them in the future. This was mainly because many participants believed that the occurrence of terrorist acts in Canada is very unlikely and that, despite the existence of the definition, not much can be done to prevent a terrorist attack.

A few participants in Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City disagreed with the above point and claimed that the definition might be helpful in catching terrorists before they act. They tended to cite the cases of Ahmed Ressam and the 'shoe bomber' as examples that Bill C-36 and the definition of terrorist activity may prevent terrorist acts or offences. This opinion was not shared by some participants in other cities, who felt that the definition itself could not prevent terrorist acts but that it was "nice to have."

It's a little bit like the anti-suicide laws. It may not keep people from killing themselves, but it sure makes a lot of people think twice about it. (Quebec City, Group 1) I read that some terrorist attack against Jewish facilities in Ottawa was prevented. I immediately thought it could be a result of these measures (anti-terrorist). (Ottawa, French Group 2) It could prevent certain groups from getting together to plan terrorist acts. (Ottawa, French Group 2)

Desire for Information

Very few participants were aware of the definition prior to the focus group sessions. Although some claimed that it would be important for the public to know, most admitted that because they were not terrorists themselves or in contact with terrorists, it was unlikely to affect them in their daily life and it was not something that they absolutely needed to know. Indeed, for many individuals, the definition was considered to be quite technical and "legal," despite its simplified form. The exception would be the minority of participants who feared, to some degree, that it might affect them or people who share their views and engage in demonstrations. This was particularly true among French-speaking participants.

3.3.3 Listing of Terrorist Entities

Participants were given a handout on the criteria for listing terrorist entities (see handout 3 in Appendix C).

The overall reaction to the listing of terrorist entities was that it is probably a 'necessary evil.' Many participants agreed in general with the measure and felt it was straight forward. However, several questioned whether having the right to appeal being listed as a terrorist entity only after the fact goes against the traditional presumption of 'innocent until proven guilty.' Participants considered this presumption one of the cornerstones of our legal system. Some also questioned whether the listing of terrorist entities is against the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Participants across both age groups and in all cities thought that this provision changed the legal process to that of 'guilty until proven innocent.' Some participants commented that the provision might unfairly label legitimate individuals or organizations, which would cause them to be stigmatized and could potentially ruin lives.

Jumping the gun, labelling people. Once you're accused you are labelled forever. (Calgary, Group 2)

Participants also felt that there must be a "good reason" for an individual or an organization to be targeted as a terrorist entity. That being said, those wary of such measures also questioned the notion of "reasonable grounds," again citing the Maher Arar affair.

You have to do something to get on the list. (Vancouver, Group 2)

Some participants had concerns about the power of the Federal Cabinet to oversee "the list" of terrorist entities. In their opinion, this power is only as good as the sources used to gather information on terrorist entities, and if the sources used were unreliable, the potential exists for mislabelling groups or individuals as terrorists.

The provision was seen by many participants as being an effective tool for identifying terrorist organizations, if it is used properly. In their opinion, it is effective because it puts terrorist organizations "out in the open," thereby informing people that these organizations are terrorist entities. Many did not believe that the provision would prevent terrorism, since they felt that nothing could stop those who have their mind set on dying for their cause. Furthermore, some participants suggested that the provision might drive terrorist organizations further 'underground.' While these participants viewed the provision as slowing down organizations, they noted that "terrorists are resourceful" and would eventually find a way around this provision (e.g. by re-naming their organizations).

The fact that the list is public was considered to be a must, although some participants see in it the danger that somebody whose name was once on the list, even if it is taken off after appeal, might still have his/her reputation tarnished. (Winnipeg Group 1 participants, who fundamentally disagreed with the concept of "the list," felt particularly strongly about this.)

Some participants questioned the practice of sharing the list with other countries, wondering if when someone's name was taken off the list after an appeal, it would be taken off the International list as well as the Canadian one. On the whole, participants believed that the list would have considerably less power and influence if it was not made public.

Many participants wondered where the list was located and if it was available to the public, given that the Act has been in place since the fall of 2001. There was a strong sense that they would like to have access to the list to see which organizations are considered to be terrorist entities.

This provision gave rise to a certain number of questions. For instance, some participants asked why, if some organizations were already on the list, they had not yet been reprimanded by the federal government. Further, they wondered why, if these organizations have indeed been reprimanded by the Government, the public has not been informed. Participants seemed to feel that informing the public of how the provision has been used would add some legitimacy to the effectiveness of the tool and give credence to the existence of the Anti-terrorism Act as a whole.

If they are listed, why aren't they investigated and charged? (Regina, Group 1) Why haven't we gone after them? (Toronto, Group 2)

Whereas people admitted that they did not know about this provision, they also claimed that they somehow suspected that such a list existed and they believed that it would be a useful tool to disable organizations promoting terrorist activities. They expected that organizations such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, as well as some Middle Eastern charities, would be on this list. Several participants had indeed heard through the media that some Middle Eastern charitable organizations were funnelling money to terrorist groups.

3.3.4 Financing of Terrorism

A handout containing information on the financing of terrorism provision was given to participants (see handout 4 in Appendix C).

Participants generally agreed with the actions that can be taken under the provision of the Act that concerns financing of terrorism. These actions were viewed by participants in Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City as being very similar to the measures taken against the Hell's Angels under the anti-gang legislation. In the other cities, while participants considered that these two laws were similar to the financial suppression laws that already exist under the Criminal Code , they viewed this provision of the Anti-terrorism Act as different in that it specifically targets terrorists. Some participants questioned the fact that the right of appeal comes after action has been taken, which is in contradiction to the traditional presumption of 'innocent until proven guilty.'

This provision also generated some questions among participants. Some had concerns about how 'innocent' people would be treated under this provision. For example, participants wondered what would happen if a company did not know it was funnelling money to a terrorist group. If this company was reprimanded, what would the punishment be and would the company have a chance to clear its name? These participants also wondered how the organization would clear its name, given that its assets would be frozen. Moreover, if the organization was found to be innocent of the charges, would it then get its assets back?

What happens prior to 'appeal.' Am I in jail? What are the rights of the individual? (Toronto, Group 1)

The main issue with this provision for many participants was the reporting obligation. Several imagined themselves in a situation where they might see something suspect going on in their neighbourhood, for example, and be "scared" to report the person or persons committing this act.

What is the reporting obligation? Is it punished if you do not report something? (Vancouver, Group 1) People will be very afraid because they can get back at them. You can't ever be totally protected against those people. (Quebec City, Group 2)

A few participants found this section of the provision 'normal' and indicated that such a reporting obligation already exists under the Criminal Code. A few felt that it is an individual's ethical duty to report any wrongdoing for the overall good of society.

Still, some participants thought that there should be some exceptions to this reporting obligation, for example, when the life of the person reporting or the lives of his or her family are at risk. Clearly, this section of the provision concerned some participants and made them feel uncomfortable.

Many participants questioned the ten-year maximum penalty. For the most part, these participants viewed this penalty as too lenient, since, as far as they knew, most people convicted of crimes in Canada do not serve their full sentence. A few participants suggested that the penalty should reflect the nature of the crime, while others suggested that the minimum sentence be ten years, thus increasing the maximum sentence.

Maximum sentence of 10 years? This should be harsher. (Vancouver, Group 2) 10 years max? Need more; it should equal the severity of the offence. (Halifax, Group 2) 10 years, here, with probation and all that can turn into 2-3 years only. It's ridiculous. (Quebec City, Group 1)

Perceived Effect on Charitable Organizations

Many participants had thought that charitable organizations could potentially be linked to terrorist groups. None of the participants had been deterred, however, from donating money because of this. Most of those interviewed said that they donated to 'legitimate' or 'mainstream' charitable organizations (e.g. the Heart and Stroke Foundation, the United Way), if at all. In Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City, the association was clearly made with Middle Eastern groups. Thus, most did not think that it would make it more difficult for 'legitimate' charitable organizations to receive donations, unless they were charitable organizations with Middle Eastern ties.

In the other cities, participants felt that this provision could affect donating practices to smaller "fringe" organizations or religious organizations. They thought that it was up to individuals to "do their homework" with regards to charitable organizations prior to making a donation, if they did not wish to become accidentally affiliated with a terrorist group.

Many thought that the provision regarding the financing of terrorism was a useful approach to preventing terrorism, and although some did not specifically know about the provision, they expected that something like it would exist, again using the anti-gang and financial suppression laws as models. Some participants were aware of the provision and felt that stopping the flow of money to terrorist organizations was a big step towards slowing them down and reducing their ability to fund their 'missions,' thereby preventing terrorism to some extent. Nevertheless, participants suspected that terrorist organizations would adapt and find other ways to fund their operations.

Most important aspect is to take away the money from terrorists. (Calgary, Group 1)

Some participants had heard of this provision when they were made aware of the Anti-terrorism Act as a whole; therefore, they did not feel they needed any more information on the provision. The general feeling was that information about the provision regarding the financing of terrorism should be communicated as part of the Act as a whole. Participants felt that any communication plan should include all five provisions, as introducing or explaining the provisions separately might confuse the general public.

3.3.5 New Investigative and Preventive Arrest Powers

After reading a handout on the new investigative and preventive arrest powers (see handout 5 in Appendix C), many participants stated that these new powers were reasonable overall. Some participants called the provision "powerful,"while a few believed that the new investigative and preventive arrest powers are "tough measures!" Participants commented that the provision strikes a good balance between individual rights and the collective rights of the general public.

These keep me and my family safe. (Winnipeg, Group 2)

Group 2 participants in Regina and Halifax as well as a minority of respondents in the French groups in Montreal and Quebec City took exception to the provisions and saw them as a violation of individual rights and freedoms. As they were reading about these provisions, they recalled the era of "McCarthyism" and thought that the police might use these new investigative tools and powers to detect crimes other than terrorism.

The reason why they made a law is not necessarily the same as the reason why they're going to enforce it afterwards - that's my worry. (Quebec City, Group 1)

A few Group 2 participants in Calgary said that these laws were "nothing new" and that Canadians have "very few rights to begin with." It should be noted that these particular participants seemed to be familiar with the law and the Criminal Code, as their stated educational background and experience indicated.

Some participants had some concerns about the wiretapping disposition. While they agreed that suspected terrorists should be wiretapped without their knowledge ("that's just common sense"), they would like some kind of reassurance that if the wiretapping uncovered other infractions unrelated to terrorism (for example, smoking marijuana), such evidence would not be allowed to lead to prosecution.

Some participants questioned the use of wiretapping in general. ( "Isn't wiretapping out of date? I would hope that they would monitor computer use as well." ) The perception among some participants was that, in this day and age, many terrorists communicate via e-mail or instant messenger technology, and they would hope that the Government and the police have the infrastructure and measures in place to monitor these avenues as well as telephone lines.

Only a small minority took issue with the fact that it is an offence to refuse to give information, especially since the provision specifies that such a refusal is not a terrorist offence.

Some of the participants who agreed in general with the investigative and preventive arrest powers did not agree, however, with the notion that a person could be arrested without a warrant if police felt the situation was urgent. According to these participants, "that is intrusive; it gives the Government and the police carte blanche," and making an arrest without a warrant is contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . As expressed with regard to other provisions, here too there is an assumption that people are "guilty until proven innocent." However, only a small minority felt this way; many of the participants were reassured by the fact that the person had to be brought before a judge within 24 hours if they were arrested. Some Group 1 participants in Halifax pointed out that someone who is not a Canadian citizen could be held for an indefinite period of time, based on very little prior evidence.

Qualitatively, a significant minority, mostly among French-speaking Group 2 participants in Montreal and Quebec City and Group 2 participants in Halifax and Regina, felt that these investigative and preventive arrest powers "go too far" and threaten our civil rights. Again, the word McCarthyism was used, as were the terms military state and police state , which reminded participants of Nazi Germany during World War II. Basically, these participants did not consider these provisions to be very useful.

(This provision) could nail people on any offences. It is another way to detect crime, McCarthyism. (Halifax, Group 2) Military State - do we not learn from history? (Regina, Group 2) You're forgetting that there have been fascist, dictatorial regimes throughout history, and humans can get back to there anytime. This is what this legislation allows. (Quebec City, Group 1)

In addition, despite the earlier discussion on the definition of a terrorist activity, a few participants expressed concern about what constitutes a terrorist offence. These participants wondered if one could be charged with terrorism as a result of using verbal threats or "jokes" (e.g. "I am so mad at my employer that I am going to blow up the office" ) or affiliation with a terrorist group. This provision put participants on their guard.

You have to be careful what you say in public. (Halifax, Group 1)

These lines of thinking also called into question the perceived usefulness of the new investigative and preventive arrest powers.

Attitudes towards Risk of Abuse

Many participants stated that they trusted the Government and the police not to abuse these powers and did not feel threatened as citizens. Most pointed out that as Caucasian and Canadian citizens, they were not particularly worried about being labelled as terrorists.

Look at me, I'm white, I'm Canadian, and I'm not a terrorist. (Vancouver, Group 2) This (provision) will not affect 99.5% of the population. (Calgary, Group 1) No, because we are not racist here. (Quebec City, Group 2)

Participants who belong to a visible minority group were clearly more cautious and pointed out that people of Middle Eastern descent were the most at risk of being the object of profiling.

Some claimed that even though they themselves may not be a target, people of Middle Eastern descent could become victims of abuse under the new investigative and preventive arrest powers. They feared that it might give rise to a form of racism, given that there have been reported cases of 'racial profiling' of other visible minority groups by the police in some cities. Furthermore, based on the experience of friends or relatives at the border or at airports since September 11, 2001, a few participants claimed that this profiling is already taking place.

If I walk through security at the same time as someone wearing a turban, who is going to get searched? (Halifax, Group 1)

Participants also commented that the images used by the media to portray terrorism further perpetuate stereotypes and are not helpful. Most of the terrorist incidents that participants had heard of seemed to involve attacks perpetrated by persons of Middle Eastern descent. The Maher Arar affair has been a major contributing factor to that point of view.

A few participants were concerned that the police might unfairly target Canadians who are part of visible minority groups but who are not of Middle Eastern descent.

Participants appeared to be divided on whether or not targeting minorities is an acceptable risk. For some, racial profiling is something they viscerally oppose; they view it as morally wrong and believe it should not be practiced or condoned. Others, who claimed to be "realists," pointed out that most, if not all, terrorists involved in suicide bombings and major attacks against civilians were of Middle Eastern descent. They expected that the police might, therefore, pay more attention to people of Middle Eastern descent. According to these participants, if the power was misused, it was for the 'greater good.'

There will inevitably be some misuse, but the public good takes precedence. (Toronto, Group 1)

Many participants across both age groups and in all cities thought that these new investigative and preventive arrest powers should be communicated to the public. This would demonstrate that the Government was doing something to combat terrorism, and it might increase the level of public confidence.

If we knew more about this, we would have more respect for the Government because at least we would be aware that they were doing something. (Toronto, Group 2)

3.3.6 Mechanisms Associated with Investigative and Preventive Arrest Powers

The sunset clause.

Participants were informed that the investigative and preventive arrest powers will disappear after five years unless the House of Commons and the Senate pass a resolution to extend the provision for another five years. This sunset clause brought a certain measure of reassurance to some participants, and they expected that the provision would indeed be extended for another five years, especially given the serious nature of terrorism. While a vast majority understood the sunset clause, a few participants mistakenly thought that after five years the provision would go away, thereby making us vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

The terrorists could just wait until the end of five years and then attack. (Halifax, Group 2)

When it was explained that the sunset clause meant that the provisions of the Act would be reviewed after five years, these participants then agreed that it was a good idea.

Participants noted that the clause was a useful tool in case any revisions to the new investigative and preventive arrest powers need to be made. It promotes the 'checks and balances' of the process.

Reporting Obligation

Participants were also informed that the Solicitor General and the Minister of Justice must report annually to Parliament on the use of these new powers and that this annual report is available to the public on departmental Internet sites. Some participants were reassured and commented that it may ensure that the police do not abuse the new powers they have been given under the Act. Many participants wondered what type of information this Parliamentary report contains, and a few said that they were going to try to find the report on their own time.

Other participants, particularly in Toronto and Regina, thought that the new investigative and preventive arrest powers should initially be reviewed more often by Parliament in order to reduce and/or eliminate any potential abuse by police.

A significant minority across both age groups and in all cities were not convinced that the sunset clause or the annual reporting to Parliament will curb abuse. They felt that if a police officer was pre-disposed to abuse these powers, then he or she will do so and that "it only takes one person accused of abusing the power to ruin the whole process." A few participants, particularly in Halifax Group 2, were of the opinion that the police are already "drunk with power" and that these new investigative tools give the police "too much power."

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Israeli Settlers Storm West Bank Village, Drawing Rare Rebukes From Israeli Officials

The Palestinian Authority said one person was shot dead; the Israeli military said it was investigating and condemned the attack, as did the Israeli prime minister.

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By Ephrat Livni

• Aug. 15, 2024

Israeli settler attacks on Palestinians have surged in the West Bank, but a riot on Thursday in the village of Jit stood out for drawing rapid and unusual rebukes from Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose coalition government includes West Bank settlers in top positions.

“Dozens of Israeli civilians, some of them masked, entered the town of Jit and set fire to vehicles and structures in the area, hurled rocks and Molotov cocktails,” the Israeli military said in a statement. The military said that its forces, along with Israeli Border Police, were dispatched to the scene and dispersed the riot by firing shots into the air and “removing the Israeli civilians from the town.”

The Palestinian Authority said that one Palestinian was shot dead during the attack on the village and that another was critically injured. The Israeli military said it was “looking into” reports of a fatality and that it had opened an investigation with other security agencies into what it called “this serious incident,” adding that one rioter was arrested and transferred to the police for questioning.

The prime minister’s office issued a statement saying that Mr. Netanyahu “takes seriously the riots that took place this evening in the village of Jit, which included injury to life and property by Israelis who entered the village.” The statement vowed to find and prosecute those responsible for “any criminal act.”

The Israeli military condemned “incidents of this type and the rioters, who harm security, law, and order,” and accused those involved in the violence of diverting troops and security forces “from their main mission of thwarting terrorism and protecting the security of civilians.”

The riot came as the war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas has stretched into its 11th month, a period that has also seen increased Israeli military activity against what it terms suspected terrorism in the occupied West Bank, as well as a surge in violent settler attacks there against Palestinians.

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